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Abstract 
For “natural enough” systems of ordinal notation we show that tl times iterated local 
reflection schema over a suflicientiy strong arithmetic T proves the same KIF-sentences as CO” 
times iterated consistency. A corollary is that the two hierarchies catch up module relative 
interpretability exactly at E-numbers. We also derive the following more general ‘“mixed” 
formulas estimating the consistency strength of iterated local reflection: for all ordinals CI 2 1 
and all p, 
(T”)fl En: TU*.~l+~), (TBY -t-i: q+o’. 
Here T” stands for c( times iterated local reflection over T, T8 stands for a times iterated 
consistency, and -np denotes (provable in T) mutual ny-conservativity. 
In an appendix to this paper we develop our notion of “natural enough” system of ordinal 
notation and show that such systems do exist for every recursive ordinal. 
1. Introduction 
Since the fundamental works of Turing [ 171 and Feferman [6] transfinite recursive 
hierarchies of axiomatic theories have been playing a significant role in proof- 
theoretic studies, mainly as a kind of tool for measuring relative strength of theories. 
Historically the first and, probably, the most important example of such a hierarchy is 
the so-called transjinite recursive progression based on iteration of consistency defined 
(roughly) according to the following clauses: 
(Tl) TO = T, T being a given “initial” theory; 
(T2) T3icI = T, + Con{ T,); 
(T3) ‘I’, = lJacd TB, for a a limit ordinal. 
Here and below Con(U) denotes the standard arithmetical sentence xpressing the 
consistency of a theory U. 
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By Godel’s Theorem, whenever the initial theory T is sound,’ the theories T, form 
a strictly increasing transfinite sequence of sound extensions of T. This sequence can 
be used to associate an ordinal ordT( U) with any theory U extending T as follows: 
ordT( U) := least c( such that U # Con(T,). 
This definition is really only meaningful for those theories U which can, in a sense, 
be well approximated by the sequence T,. For such theories (fortunately, these include 
the most natural extensions of T) one can usually show that Tord,cuj exhausts all 
arithmetical II:-consequences of U, that is, 
U =n: Tordr(u,. (1) 
(This equivalence can itself be considered as a definition of the property of well- 
approximation above.) Possible verification of the equivalence (1) within T immedi- 
ately implies 
and thus, ordT( U) can be thought of as an ordinal measuring the consistency strength 
of the theory U with respect o T. 
A well-known difficulty in the way of this program roots in the fact that the clauses 
(Tl)-(T3) do not uniquely define the sequence of theories T,, that is, the theory 
T, depends on the formal representation of the ordinal a within arithmetic rather than 
on the ordinal itself. 
For the analysis of this problem Feferman [6] considered families of theories of the 
form (Tc)coc satisfying (Tl)-(T3) along every path within 0, where Lo is Kleene’s 
universal system of ordinal notation. Using an idea of Turing, he showed that every 
true II y-sentence is provable in T, for a suitable ordinal notation c E 0 with 
ICI = o + 1. It follows that there are two ordinal notations a,b~O with 
la/ = 1 bl = o + 1 such that T, proves Con( T6), and this observation seems to break 
down the program of associating ordinals to theories as described above, at least in 
the general case. 
A possibility remains that for natural (mathematically meaningful) theories U, one 
can exhaust all II:-consequences of U using only specific natural ordinal notations, 
and a careful choice of such notations should yield proper ordinal bounds. This idea 
has been developed in the work of Schmerl[12] who showed among other things, e.g., 
that for natural ordinal notations, 
PA En: PRAeO. 
Thus, ordPRA(PA) = sO, which coincides with the ordinal associated with PA through 
other proof-theoretic methods. (In this formula PRA could be replaced by any finite 
subtheory of PA.) 
I That is, if all theorems of T hold in the standard model of arithmetic. 
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The quoted result is a corollary of a more general theorem relating different 
restricted versions of iterated uniform reflection principles over PRA modulo -n: 
and zn; for n > 1. Recall (cf. [8, 141) that the (full) uniform reflection principle for 
a theory T is the schema 
whereas the local reflection principle is defined as 
Here Fm T and St T denote the sets of all formulas and sentences in the language of T, 
and PrT( .) is the standard provability predicate for T. 
Recursive hierarchies of theories based on iteration of the uniform and local 
reflection principles are defined in analogy with (Tl)-(T3). The clause (T2) should 
then be replaced, respectively, by 
(T~RFN)T~+I = T, -t RFN(7’,) and 
(TIM,) T,+ I = T, + Rfn(T,). 
From the results of Schmerl it follows that, for natural systems of ordinal notation, 
1 + c1 times iterated uniform reflection principle over PRA proves the same II:- 
sentences as E, times iterated consistency. The corresponding question for iterated 
local reflection principles, however, remained open. In the following, the hierarchy of 
theories based on iteration of local reflection principles will be denoted T a, and we 
shall keep the notation T, for the hierarchy of iterated consistency assertions. We 
mention a few basic results on local reflection principles relevant for our work. 
Lab [9] showed that an instance PrT(rAl) -+ A of the local reflection schema is 
provable in the theory T if and only if so is the sentence A (Lbb’s Theorem). 
Feferman [6] considered transfinite recursive progressions (TC)coc based on iter- 
ation of local reflection. He showed that, for every ordinal notation c E 0, the theory 
Tc is contained in the set of consequences of all true II? arithmetical sentences over T. 
Therefore, the progression based on iteration of local reflection is “ultimately” of the 
same strength as the progression based on iteration of consistency: 
CyC T’ = ci T, s T + all true II:-sentences. 
On the other hand, Kreisel and Lkvy [8] proved that T ’ = T + Rfn( T) cannot be 
majorized by any recursively enumerable set of true lip-sentences over T, and 
therefore T1 $ T, for all c E 0. 
Artemov [2] showed that, although obviously T, c T ‘, for no c E 0 with Ic( > w 
do we have T, G T ‘. This result relies on a beautiful emma, coming from provability 
logic and proved by Boolos [S] and independently by Artemov [l], stating that in 
order to derive n < o times iterated consistency for any theory T no less than 
n instances of the local reflection schema for T are needed. 
Goryachev [7] brought essentially the same idea to a particularly nice form by 
showing that the theories T1 and T, are, in fact, mutually interpretable, and thus, 
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prove the same II:-sentences (whatever the initial theory T, both T1 and T, are 
always reflexive theories, cf. [3]). 
In this paper we extend Goryachev’s theorem to higher ordinals in the spirit of 
Schmerl’s results, thus establishing precise relationship between the hierarchies of 
iterated local reflection principles and iterated consistency assertions for natural 
ordinal notation systems. We show that, for ordinals CI 2 1, a times iterated local 
reflection schema over any sufficiently strong arithmetic T proves the same 
II:-sentences as O@ times iterated consistency. (Notice that this ordinal does not 
essentially depend on the choice of the initial theory T, whereas for the case of iterated 
uniform reflection it does: we have PRA + RFN(PRA) =np PRA,,, but 
PA + RFN(PA) -ny PRA,, .) We also derive the following more general “mixed” 
formulas: 
(WB -ny Tm=.tl+,v), (T$ =ny T,+,.. (2) 
In an appendix to this paper we isolate the properties of natural systems of ordinal 
notation needed for the above formulas to hold. This allows us to show that such 
systems exist for every constructive ordinal. Rather than saying much about the 
well-known problem of the choice of natural ordinal notations for large ordinals, this 
result merely shows that relationships uch as (2) are general enough to hold even for 
those notation systems which, perhaps, would not serve as “natural” for some other 
proof-theoretic investigations. Therefore, a comprehensible formulation of the 
amount of natural properties of well-orders used here seems to be of some indepen- 
dent interest. 
2. Preliminaries 
2.1. Theories 
All theories in this paper are assumed to be first order and to contain primitive 
recursive arithmetic (PRA) (cf. [14]). We also assume that each theory T comes 
together with a primitive recursive (p.r.) formula Ax,(x) numerating the set of Godel 
numbers of mathematical xioms of T, from which a p.r. formula Prf,(y, x) expressing 
the predicate “y is (the Gn. of) a proof in T of the formula (with the G.n.) x” is 
constructed in the standard way. Let PrT(x) abbreviate 3y Prfr(y, x) and Con(T) := 
iPrT(rO = ll). 
Parametric families of theories are numerated by p.r. formulas Ax(x) containing 
some free variables other than x. In particular, the formula AxTln(x) := 
(Axr(x) AX < n) numerates the canonical family (T 1 n)npN of finite subtheories of 
a theory T. 
Two theories U and V are equioalent iff they have the same set of theorems. In this 
case we also write V = I/. When used in a formalized context this notation is meant to 
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abbreviate the formula vx (Pi-“(x)* Pi-“(x)). Similarly, U E V denotes Yx (Pru(x) + 
Prv(x)), U ~~7 V denotes Y/x ~II?(pru(x) -+ Pr”(x)), and U =ny V means 
Vx E IIv(Pru(x)cr Pr”(x)), where II: stands for (a p.r. definition of) the set of Godel 
numbers of arithmetical II y-sentences. 
Further, we write U c>V for v’n U t- Con( T 1 n). The following lemma is both well- 
known and easy to verify. 
Lemma 2.1. The following properties are provable in PRA for any theories U and V: 
1. VEU-+VE”OU I ’ 
2. Ur>V-VEpU 
3. V Sn; U -+ (Con(U) -+ Con(V)). 
If a theory V is reflexive, that is, if Vc-V, we also have V CRY U + Ur>V, and the 
two relations V sny U and Ur>V become equivalent. It is also well known that for 
reflexive theories the relations ‘ny and D are equivalent o that of relative interpreta- 
bility (cf. e.g. [18].) 
2.2. Recursive progressions 
There are at least two ways to formalize the definition (Tl)-(T3) of transfinite 
progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency. One relies on the concept of 
a (primitive) recursive well-ordering relation, as e.g. in [12], and the other one relies on 
the concept of constructive system of ordinal notation, as in [6]. The difference between 
the two approaches is largely technical, but, at least for our present purposes, the 
former seems to be more convenient han the latter. The reason is that, under rather 
weak natural assumptions, transfinite recursive progressions of theories dealt with in 
this paper actually do not depend on the choice of fundamental sequences for 
ordinals. Therefore, our work will be greatly simplified, if these are avoided from the 
very beginning. 
A primitive recursive well-ordering (D, <) is a relative interpretation of the first- 
order theory of linear orderings in PRA with domain D, such that the predicates x ED 
and x < y are (interpreted as) p.r. formulas and the relation < well-orders the set D in 
the standard model of arithmetic. (The statement hat (D, <) is a relative interpreta- 
tion of the theory of linear orderings in PRA essentially means that PRA proves that 
the relation < linearly orders the set D.) 
Suppose we are given a sound “initial” theory T and a p.r. well-ordering (D, < ). 
A p.r. formula Ax~(z;x) is called a smooth numeration of a progression based on 
iteration of consistency along (D, <) iff PRA proves 
~~,~(A~,(~;X)~AX~(X)V(ZEDA~UED(U<ZAX=~C~~(T~)~))). (3) 
Here T, denotes the theory numerated by Ax&x). For the sake of readability we 
shall also write PrT(z; x) for Pr,;(x). 
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Clearly, the definition (3) has the form of a fixed point equation; therefore, smooth 
numerations can be constructed for any given p.r. well-ordering. It only has to be 
noted that the existential quantifier in (3) can actually be bounded by x, assuming the 
Godel numbering we use is standard, so the solution of the fixed point equation has to 
be equivalent o a p.r. formula. Then one can show, by metamathematical transfinite 
induction, that (7’U),,D is a strictly increasing sequence of sound theories satisfying 
(Tl)-(T3). Moreover, the fact that the relation < linearly orders the set D provably in 
PRA guarantees that PRA proves the formal analogs of (Tl)-(T3): 
(Vl) “U = O”vu$D + \dx (Axr(u;x)++AxT(x)), 
(V2) “u = u + 1” -+ Yx (Ax,(u;x)c*(Axr(u;x) vx = ‘Con(T;)l)), 
(V3) LIM(u) -+ vx (Ax,(u;x)++~z E D(z < u A Ax,(z;x))). 
Here the expression “u = 0” abbreviates the formula 
UEDAVZED(U < zvu = z), 
“u = u + 1” means 
and LIM(u) denotes 
From now on we shall adopt the following notational convention. Greek variables 
~1, b, y, etc., will always be assumed to range over ordinals, that is, over the domain D. 
Mathematical symbols like 0, 1, <, +, etc., will refer to the operations and predicates 
on ordinals. In the rare occasions when the ordinary arithmetical operations on 
natural numbers are used, they will be typed in boldface characters. 
Formulas Ax=(z; x) satisfying (the analogs of) (Vl)-(V3) are called verijable numer- 
ations for progressions based on iteration of consistency in [6]. Thus, smooth 
numerations are verifiable, but the converse is, generally, not true. We can only say 
that verifiable numerations are smooth in presence of transfinite induction for (D, <), 
which is usually only the case for rather small ordinals. 
Conditions like verifiability or smoothness can be thought of as coherence condi- 
tions on the simultaneous choice of numerations of theories (T,),,D of a recursive 
progression. Whereas verifiability seems to be the weakest reasonable assumption of 
this sort, smoothness implies some additional natural properties of progressions. E.g., 
smooth numerations are provably monotone in the sense that they satisfy the following 
property provably in PRA: 
(V4) VU, /?(a < j? + Vx (Pr=(cx; ) + Prr( b; x))). 
This property follows immediately from (3) and provable transitivity of <. 
For smooth numerations we also have the following useful property. 
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Lemma 2.2. If AxT(z;x) is a smooth numeration of a recursive progression based on 
iteration of consistency, then PRA proves 
Va, P(a < j -+ Vx (Pr&x)t-*+j < /?PrT(~;rCon(Ti,)l i x))). 
Proof. We give an informal argument hat can be readily formalized in PRA. 
By provable monotonicity (V4) T, E TO, and by the definition of smoothness T, is 
axiomatized over T, by all sentences of the form Con( T,) with y < p. The implication 
( t ) follows immediately. 
To show ( + ) consider an arbitrary derivation y of a formula x in T,. From y one 
can primitively recursively reconstruct he finite set of all axioms of the form Con( T,) 
used in this derivation. Using provable linearity of < pick the axiom corresponding 
to the largest ordinal out of this set. By (V4) this axiom will be the strongest one, so the 
other axioms can be replaced in y by their respective derivations from this axiom. 
Since the proof of (V4) is uniform in CI and p, the total length of such derivations can 
be estimated by a p.r. function of y. This shows that such a proof transformation can 
be carried out inside PRA. It only remains to apply the formalized deduction 
theorem. 0 
Concerning the definitions of verifiability and smoothness a natural question 
arises: can one impose any additional natural requirements on the choice of numer- 
ations of recursive progressions that smooth numerations possibly lack? There is an 
easy, but nonetheless rather surprising answer to this question. No, smooth numer- 
ations are, in a very strong sense, optimal, because of the following uniqueness 
property. 
Lemma 2.3 (Uniqueness). Any two smooth numerations AxT(z; x) and Ax+(z; x) along 
one and the same p.r. well-ordering (D, <) and satisfying the same initial conditions 
define equivalent progressions of theories based on iteration of consistency, i.e., provably 
in PRA, 
The uniqueness property is a robust background for our further treatment of 
recursive progressions of theories, and, in particular, it shows that these progressions, 
when smoothly defined, do not depend on the choice of fundamental sequences for 
ordinal notations. 
The proof of Lemma 2.3 employs a trick from the work of Schmerl[12], which will 
also be extensively used later in this paper. 
Lemma 2.4 (Reflexive induction). For any p.r. well-ordering (D, <), any theory T is 
closed under the following reflexive induction rule: 
v’cr (Pr&V/? < iA(f -+ A(a))l-V’a A(a). 
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Proof. Assuming TkVcr (PrT(rVfi < iA(/ -+ A(a)) we derive 
Tl-Prr(‘Va A(a)l) + Vci Pr,(‘Vp < iA(f 
-+ VE A(N). 
Lob’s Theorem for T then yields T l-Va A(ct). 0 
We shall also use reflexive transfinite induction on two variables, in the form of 
double induction: 
VaV /?(Prr(‘V’yV’G ((y < oiv (y = oi~6 < /i))~A(y,6))l)~A(a,B)) 
k VcXV’PA(GI,/3). 
This rule is clearly reducible to the previous one for a suitable p.r. well-ordering. 
Proof of Lemma 2.3. We prove T, c Th by reflexive transfinite induction on a reason- 
ing informally inside PRA. Suppose x is an axiom of T,, then either x is an axiom of T, 
or it has the form Con( T,) for some /I < a (by (3)). In the first case we are done; in the 
second case by Induction Hypothesis’ we have 
PRAkV,y<aT,gT;, 
hence 
PRAkT,cT;, 
and 
PRA I- Con( Tj) + Con( T,) 
by Lemma 2.1. It follows that 
Til-Con(Ti) 
I- Con( T,), 
and thus we have shown that every axiom of T, is provable in Ti. To conclude from 
this fact that all theorems of T, are provable in Ti normally one would use Cy- 
collection schema, which is not available in PRA. However, for this particular case we 
can overcome this difficulty as follows. 
First of all conclude using Zy-collection that T, E Th. Then observe that the 
statement T, E Ti is equivalent in PRA to a II,“-sentence, and therefore the whole 
‘premise of the reflexive induction rule we have just proved using Cy-collection is. 
’ In an argument by reflexive induction, by the Induction Hypothesis we shall always mean the formalized 
statement, that is, Prr(Vfl < L?A(/?)~). 
L. BeklemishealAnnals of Pure and Applied Logic 75 (1995) 25-48 33 
Now, by a well-known result of Parsons (cf. [ 13]), C y-collection schema is conserva- 
tive over PRA for II!-sentences so we infer that the premise of the reflexive induction 
rule is provable in PRA, and we can apply this rule to get the result. 0 
For p.r. well-orderings atisfying a minor additional requirement, namely that 
PRA E Vu@ “/I = a + l”, 
a similar argument can be used to show that smooth progressions are the weakest of 
all those defined by verifiable, provably monotone numerations. This shows that 
smooth numerations occupy a distinguished place among all the others.3 
Smooth numerations for recursive progressions based on iteration of local reflec- 
tion are defined in analogy with (3). A p.r. formula Ax~(z;x) is called a smooth 
numeration of a progression based on iteration of local reflection along (D, <) iff PRA 
proves 
Vz, x(Axr(z; x)+-+ AxT(x) v (z ED A 3u E D(u < z 
~3v~Strx = (‘Pr,(ti;ti) Gu)))). 
Theories numerated by such Ax,(z; x), for z E D, will be denoted T”. The analogs of 
verifiability conditions, provable monotonicity property, and the uniqueness lemma 
hold for smooth progressions based on iteration of local reflection, too, with similar 
proofs, so we shall not repeat them again. 
2.3. Nice well-orderings 
For the relationships uch as (2) to hold the p.r. well-orderings under consideration 
must satisfy some additional “natural” requirements. For one thing, it is natural to 
require that the ordinal functions +, ., and ox involved in these formulas are 
represented by p.r. terms, and that some basic properties of these operations are 
provable in PRA. These can be formulated in the following way. 
Fix an arbitrary s-number 1 and consider I as a first-order structure with individual 
constants 0, 1, o; unary relations SUC, LIM defining the sets of successor and limit 
ordinals < 2, respectively; binary relations <, = ; and the standard ordinal functions 
+ ;,andw”. 
In the appendix we give a rather long list of axioms of a first-order theory NW0 (for 
“nice well-orderings”) in the above language, which summarizes the basic properties 
of this structure that we need. For the first reading of this paper the reader is 
encouraged not to look there at all and to believe that all properties he/she can think 
of, but for transfinite induction, are present. For his/her convenience at latter stages, 
inside the formal proofs in the next two sections we added references to the axioms 
3 It is also worth noticing that, under some further natural requirements on the p.r. well-orderings in 
question, verifiable numerations become provably monotone. So, for natural well-orderings smooth 
numerations are the weakest of all verifiable ones. 
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or theorems of NW0 really used. Thus, e.g., reference A9b points to the theorem of 
NW0 numbered 9b in the appendix. 
Keeping this information in mind, we give the following definition of a nice p.r. 
well-ordering. 
Definition 1. A nice well-ordering is a relative interpretation of the theory NW0 in 
PRA such that 
Its domain D and all atomic predicates <, SUC, LIM, functions +, ., wX, and 
constants 0, 1, o are defined by primitive recursive arithmetical formulas (terms).4 
The (interpreted) relation < well-orders the domain D in the standard model of 
arithmetic. 
Natural numbers can be identified with ordinals co, that is, for the p.r. function 
( .) * given within PRA by the following schema: 
o* = 0; (n+l)* = n* + 1, 
we have 
PRAl-V’a (tl < o + 3n a = n*). (4) 
The latter property of nice well-orderings is a fairly strong and useful requirement, 
for it implies (and is essentially equivalent o) the following lemma. 
Lemma 2.5. For nice well-orderings, primitive recursive induction schema for ordinals 
<o is available in PRA, that is, 
PRAt-Va < w(V/I < a A(B) --) A(a)) + V’a < w&a) 
for every p.r. formula A(a). 
Proof. Consider the p.r. formula A’(n) := A(n*) and prove Vn A’(n) by the ordinary 
p.r. induction on n. Then use condition (4). As an intermediate step one should 
establish within PRA that 
Vm, n(m < nc*m* < n*) 
by straightforward p.r. induction using A10 and the definition of ( * )*. 0 
2.4. Composition properties 
The uniqueness lemma for smooth recursive progressions allows us to use consis- 
tently notation like (Tbl)B or (TO), for the composition of progressions of theories 
defined along the same p.r. well-ordering. For nice well-orderings we can verify the 
following “obvious” relationships that will later be used without notice. 
4 It is convenient here to think of the constants as of 0-ary function symbols. So, their interpretations must 
be closed p.r. terms (i.e., essentially, numerals). 
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Lemma 2.6. For progressions of theories dejned along nice well-orderings the following 
equivalences are provable in PRA: 
1. V’aVfi(T&J f T,+,, 
2. V&q?(T”)B = T”+fl. 
Proof. We prove only the first statement. The argument goes by reflexive transfinite 
induction on fl in PRA and using Cy-collection as in the proof of Lemma 2.3. 
For the inclusion ( c ) we have: any axiom of ( 7’b)B is either an axiom of T,, and in 
this case we are done, because by A4a c1 < a + /I. Or it has the form Con(T&, for 
some 6 < fl, and then by Induction Hypothesis 
PRAt-Con(T,+b) + Con(T,)d. 
So. we conclude 
T,,, I- Con( Ta+d) (by A4c and the definition of smoothness) 
F Con( T&. 
For the converse inclusion we reason as follows: an axiom of T,,, is either an 
axiom of T, in which case we are done, since T c T, c (T&. Or it has the form 
Con(T,) for some y < a + /I. By A9a either y < IX or 36 < fl(y = c( + 6). In the first 
case we are done by provable monotonicity, and in the second case the Induction 
Hypothesis yields 
PRAl-Con(T,), + Con(T,+d) 
-+ Con( TY). 
So, by the definition of smoothness 
3. The lower bound 
In this section we shall prove the inclusion 
which provides a lower bound to the consistency strength of iterated local reflection 
principles. From now on we assume a nice p.r. well-ordering fixed and consider only 
smoothly numerated recursive progressions. We shall need the following two auxili- 
ary lemmas. 
Lemma 3.1. For any theory T, PRA proves Vu < oT ’ kCon(T,). 
Lemma 3.2. For any theory T, PRA proves Vy V’cr c o T 1 I- Con( TY) + Con( T,,,). 
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Proof. Lemma 3.1 obviously follows from Lemma 3.2. Also notice that, informally, 
both of the claims are rather straightforward. The proof of Lemma 3.2 relies on the 
fact that, for nice well-orderings, natural numbers can be identified with ordinals <w 
by the mapping (*)*. So, for a fixed y, we define the following arithmetical formula: 
Z(x) := (Con(T),) + Con(T),+,*)) 
and show within PRA that 
vn T l I- Z(n). (5) 
The argument goes by induction on n. Obviously, T 1 t-I(O), and if T 1 t I(n) then 
T ’ I- Z(n + l), because 
Tit-Con(T,)+Con(T,+,*) (by IH) 
+ Con(T + Con(T,+,*)) (by an instance of local reflection) 
-+ COW,+,*+ I) (by Lemma 2.2) 
-+ ConVy+c,+lj*) (by the definition of *). 0 
It remains us to notice that the length of the derivation of 1(n) in T ’ can be estimated 
by a primitive recursive function of n; therefore, the above induction on n is available 
in PRA. 
Now we recall that, for nice well-orderings, PRA proves V/a < w 3n CI = n*, and so, 
Va < o 3n T ’ I-IX = n*, by Zy-completeness. Together with (5) this yields the result. 
Lemma 3.3. PRA proves Vo! > 1 V’p Vy (TY)wa.cl+Bj E (TY+dl)D. 
Proof. We prove the statement Vy (T y)o=. cl +8j E (T y+a)B arguing within PRA by 
double reflexive transfinite induction on (a, fi). As in the proof of Lemma 2.3 we may 
assume that Cy-collection schema is available. 
It suffices to show that any axiom of (TY)wu.cl+Bj is a theorem of (TY+u)p. By the 
definition of smoothness, an axiom of (T ‘) ws c1 +8J is either an axiom of T y, in which 
case our claim is trivial, or has the form Con(T y)a for some 6 < O’. (1 + #I). We 
distinguish several cases. 
Case 1: a = 1. 
Casel.l: /?=O.Theno”*(l +j?)=o’.(l +O)=w.l =obyA3b,A5dandA7b. 
So we have 6 <o and Lemma 3.1 yields: (TY+‘),, 3 (TY)lFCon(TY)d. 
Case 1.2: SUC(p), that is, #I is a successor ordinal. By All there is a B’ such that 
B = /?’ + 1. Then o.(l + j?) = w.(l + j?‘) + o and hence, by A9b, 6 < o.(l + B’) 
+ v for some v < o. By provable monotonicity we have 
Tl--Con(TY),.~l+8~~+v+Con(TY),. (6) 
However, for all j?’ < /I by the definition of smoothness we have 
(TY+1)8t-Con(TY+1)p,, 
whence 
(TY+ ‘),!-Con(TY)d. 
Case 2: c1 = a’ + 1 is a successor ordinal, a’ 3 1. 
Case 2. 1: b = 0. By Lemma 3.1 we have TY+*‘+ikCon(T ?+“)“, for all v < o. It 
follows that TY+“FCon(TY),a,.(l +“), by Induction Hypothesis. Since 6 < od = 
w a’+1 = oQ’ * w, we conclude that, for some v < o, 6 < 0”. v < w”. (1 + v) (by A6a, 
A6b, A13), and hence T y+aF Con(T y)a by provable monotonicity. 
Case 2.2: fi = fl’ + 1 is a successor ordinal. Then 0’. (1 + /I) = wa+ (1 + p’) + w’. 
Since 6 < wa. (1 + b), there is a v < w such that 6 < wa. (1 + fi’) + 0”. v (by A9b and 
A6a). By Lemma 3.2 we have 
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On the other hand, 
(TY+1)0t-Con(TY+1)8, 
l-Con(TY,+ +@‘) (by IH) 
~Con(TY),.o+8’)+v (by Lemma 3.2) 
k Con(T y)s, (by (6)). 
Case 1.3: LIM(/?), that is, /I is a limit ordinal. By A15a there is a fl’ < /I such that 
6 < o ‘(1 + /I’). Induction Hypothesis along with the provable monotonicity prop- 
erty yields 
Tt-Con(TY+1)8, -+Con(TY),.(l+s., 
-+ Con( T y)a. 
TY+a’+1FCon(TY+“‘),.~,+8~~+Con(TY+”’),.,l+B~~+v. (7) 
On the other hand, 
(TY+“)BkCon(TY+“)BF 
l-Con( Tcy+“)+ ‘)ap 
l-Con(TY+a’),.(l+B.J (by IH with & = 1, B = /I’, j7 = y + a’) 
l-Con(TY+“‘),.,l+8,j+v (by (7)) 
~Con(TY),Q~,.,l+B,,+,a~., (by IH with & = a’) 
ä Con(TY),..o+s,,+wa..Y 
l-Con(TY)d, (by provable monotonicity). 
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Case 2.3: /I is a limit ordinal. Then there is a /I’ < /I such that 6 < ma .(l + /I’), by 
Al5a. So we obtain 
(Ty+a)BtCon(TY+“)BV 
ä Con(TY),=.,1 +8,J (by IH) 
k-Con(TY),, (by monotonicity). 
Case 3: tl is a limit ordinal. 
Case 3.1: p = 0. We have that 6 < w” for a suitable a’ < a, by A8b. Then, clearly, 
(TY+“)O E TY+al-Con(TY+“‘) 
l-Con(TQ, (by IH) 
FCon(TY), 
Case 3.2: /I = 8’ + 1 is a successor ordinal. 
Then 6 < w’.(l + /P) + ma’, for some a’ < a (by A9b and A8b). Let 1 be such that 
a’ + 2 = a (A4b); clearly 1 < 1~ a (A3b, A4c, A4d). By Lemma 3.2 we have 
Ty+a 3 TY+“‘+l~Con(TY+“‘),l. - (1+8’) + Con(TY+“),L.(i+fl,)+ 1. (8) 
On the other hand, 
(TY+b)Bl-Con(TY+LI)B, 
FCon(T(Y+a’)+‘)8, 
t-Con(TY+“‘),~.o+8,) (by IH with & = 1, F = /Y, 7 = y + a’) 
ä Con(TY+d’)oi.(1+8,)+1 (by (8)) 
ä Con(TY’),u,.,l.(,+Il,)+o”’ (by IH with di = a’) 
ä Con(TY),u.(l+p,)+on. 
kCon(TY), (by provable monotonicity). 
Case 3.3: fl is a limit ordinal. This case is fully similar to Case 2.3. 
The nine cases just considered exhaust all possibilities by the axioms A2c, A2d 
defining the predicates SUC and LIM. This observation completes our proof of 
Lemma 3.3. 0 
4. The upper bound 
In this section we shall prove the inclusion 
(T”), %I: T,e.o +@), 
which provides an upper bound to the consistency strength of iterated local reflection 
principles. The following two auxiliary lemmas are crucial for our proof. 
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Lemma 4.1. For any theory T, PRA proves T,clT ‘. 
Proof. This fact is just a formalization of Goryachev’s theorem [7]. For reader’s 
convenience we give an easy informal proof and then explain why it works within 
PRA. 
The underlying idea comes from provability logic in the form of the following 
lemma essentially due to Boolos [5] and Artemov [l]. Let H, denote the following 
propositional modal formula: 
H, := A (UPi + Pi), 
i=l 
and let 0 “I abbreviate 0 Cl . . . 01, where I is the constant “falsum”. 
V 
n times 
Lemma 4.2. The following formula is a theorem of the provability logic GL for every n: 
10 “+‘I+lOlH,. (9) 
Proof. Consider an arbitrary finite irreflexive tree-like Kripke model for GL. If the 
formula 10 “+ ‘I is forced at the root of this model, then there is a chain of at least 
n + 1 nodes above it. However, any conjunct of the form UPi -+ Pi can be false at no 
more than one node of this chain. Therefore, by Pigeon Hole Principle, there is a node 
above the root of this model that forces H,. 0 
Proceeding with the proof of Goryachev’s theorem recall that according to the 
arithmetical interpretation of provability logic the modality 0 is translated as the 
provability predicate in T. Therefore, under this interpretation, 10 “+ ‘1 is equiva- 
lent to the statement Con( T,,), whereas 1 01 H, asserts the consistency of T to- 
gether with (arbitrary) n instances of local reflection. As T, contains Con(T,) and 
arithmetical interpretations of all theorems of GL are provable in PRA, the result 
follows. 
To formalize the previous argument in PRA, first of all, notice that in Lemma 4.2 
the proof in GL of the formula (9) can be found as a p.r. function of n. This follows, 
essentially, from the fact that the decision procedure for GL is primitive recursive (and 
verifiable in PRA). Further, observe that a proof in PRA of an arithmetical interpreta- 
tion of (9) is obtained from that in GL, roughly, by substituting everywhere arithmeti- 
cal sentences (or their Giidel numbers) for propositional variables, so that the result is 
p.r. in the size of these sentences, and the fact that it is a PRA-proof can be verified in 
PRA (by induction on the length of the GL-derivation). Finally, given an n we can 
primitively recursively find a substitution, say fn, of arithmetical sentences to proposi- 
tional variables p 1, . . . , pn such that (verifiably in PRA) 
V’n PRAk,f,(l 01 H,) -+ Con(T 1 In). 
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This follows from the understanding that, under the standard Godel numbering, no 
more than n instances of local reflection may have Godel numbers smaller than n. 
Combining these three things together we conclude that, for each n, the proof of 
Con(T’ In) within PRA from the arithmetical interpretation of 10”” I is found 
(verifiably) primitively recursively in n. (We denote this interpretation byf(l q *+I I) 
dropping the subscript n at f to stress the fact that the result does not depend on 
a particular substitution of arithmetical sentences for propositional variables.) What 
remains to be seen for the proof of Lemma 4.1 is essentially contained in the second 
part of the following lemma. 
Lemma 4.3. PRA proves 
1. Vn PRAtf(1 q ““I)HCon(T,t), 
2. v’n T"Ff(lO"+'I). 
Proof. Part 1 is proved by straightforward p.r. induction on n within PRA using 
Lemma 2.2 at the induction step. Part 2 follows from Part 1 and the following 
property of nice well-orderings: 
PRAI-Vn (n* <w). 
This property can easily be established by p.r. induction on n using A14d, and this 
observation completes our proof of Lemmas 4.3 and 4.1. 0 
Lemma 4.4. For any theory T, PRA proves V,‘cr T, + o D( T ’ + Con( TJ). 
Proof. We argue informally within PRA. Since the statement o be proved has 
II,” form, w.1.o.g. we may assume that ,X:-collection principle is available. By Lemmas 
4.1 and 2.6 we have 
T oI+Ul MT,)‘. 
On the other hand, by provable monotonicity 
(T’ + Con(T,)) z (T,)l, 
(10) 
and thus, for all n there is an m such that 
(T’ In + Con(T,)) E (T,)’ rm. (11) 
Since the theory T 1 In + Con(T,) has finitely many axioms, Cy-collection implies 
that statement (11) is equivalent to a .ZF-formula. Therefore, by ,X:-completeness 
principle, (11) must be provable in PRA together with CF-collection, ergo in PRA 
itself. (Here we use the fact that Parsons’ theorem is actually formalizable in PRA, 
which can be readily seen from its proof given in [13].) So, we conclude that 
PRA k Con((T,)’ /m) + Con(T’ In + Con(T,)). 
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By (10) we have 
vm Tnfw kCon((T,)‘rm). 
It follows that 
Vn T,+, FCon(T’ In + Con(T,)). 0 
Remark. Notice that Lemmas 4.1 and 4.4 can be stated in a strengthened form. E.g., 
for Lemma 4.1 we also have 
T,!-Con(T + T’ In), 
for every n, although, in general, T need not be a jnite subtheory of the theory T ‘. 
The possibility of such a strengthening follows immediately from the given proof of 
Goryachev’s theorem, and we shall use it in the proof of our main technical emma 
below. 
Lemma 4.5. PRA prows Vcz > 1 V’p Vy ( TY),z.cl+a, L)(T~“)~. 
Proof. We argue by double reflexive transfinite induction on (~1,fl) within PRA 
assuming Cy-collection, as we did before. We consider the following cases. 
Case 1: s( = 1. 
Case 1.1: b = 0. We have to show that (Ty)o~.~l+O~ E (TY),r>TY+l. But this is, 
essentially, the claim of Lemma 4.1. 
Case 1.2: p = fl’ + 1 is a successor ordinal. First of all, notice that, for all n, 
(T’+‘)8 In = ((Tyi’),, + Con(TY+‘)BV) In 
s (TY+1)8s In + Con(Ts’l)p 
E T + (TY+‘) tn + Con(Tyf’)p., 
because by provable monotonicity Tl-Con(TY+‘)a, +Con(TY+l)d for all 6 < /I’. 
Induction Hypothesis yields 
Tt- (TY)w.(l+B,)c>(TY+l)B,, 
whence 
Tl-Con(TY),.,l+sf, -+ Con(TYf’)BS 
by Lemma 2.1, and we conclude 
(TY+l)p In G TY + (TY+‘) In + Con(TY),.(l+BSj. (12) 
As in the proof of Lemma 4.4, by CF-collection and C y-completeness principles, and 
using the formalization of Parsons’ theorem in PRA we obtain 
Tl-Con(TY + (TY+‘) fn + Con(TY),.,l+BS,) -+Con((TY+l)B In). (13) 
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Applying (the strengthened form of) Lemma 4.4 to the theory T Y we get 
V’n (TY),.(l+B,)+w~Con(TY + (Ty”)ln + Con(TY),.o+B,j), 
and together with (13) this yields the result. 
Case 1.3: /l is a limit ordinal. For every n there is a p’ < /I such that (T y+l)B In E 
(T y+ ‘)ap. Take a /I’ bigger than any 6 < /? such that ‘Con( T y+ ’ )al < n. (Since there is 
an a priori upper bound ( = n) on the size of the code of any such 6, the finite set of all 
6’s exists even in absence of Cy-collection.) So, by Cy-completeness principle, as in the 
previous case, we conclude 
Tl-Con(TY+l)O, -+ Con(( Ty+l)B rn). 
On the other hand, we have 
(TY)o.o+~) kCon(TY),.(l+B,l (by A15b) 
tCon(TY+l)P, (by 11-l and Lemma 2.1) 
kCon((TY+l)D In) (by (14)). 
Case 2: o! = CY’ + 1 is a successor ordinal, tl’ 2 1. 
Case 2.1: /? = 0. We have to show 
V’n (TY)wa~+I~Con(TY+“‘+’ In). 
Notice that by Lemma 4.1 for every n there is a 6 < o such that 
(TY+“‘),kCon(Ty+a’+l In). 
(14) 
By Cy-completeness (applied twice) we obtain 
Tl-Con(TY+“‘)d -+Con(T + Con(TY+a’+l In)) 
-+Con(TY+a’+l In). 
By A15b, A14a, and algebraic properties of ox, for all 6 < w, 
&.(l + 6) < c#‘.W = ga’+l = @a. 
It follows that 
(TY),n~Con(TY)oa,.(1+6) 
kCon(TY+“‘)d (by IH and Lemma 2.1) 
t-Con(TY+” In) (by (15)). 
(15) 
Case 2.2: /I = /I’ + is a successor ordinal. First of all, similarly to Case 1.2 we have 
that, for all n, 
(TY+“)p In E T + (TY+“) In + Con(TY+“)P, 
and 
TFCon(T + (TY+“) tn + Con(T’+“)P,) + Con((TY+“)B In). (16) 
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On the other hand, by Lemma 4.4, 
kfn (TY+a’)w.(1+8,j+ok Con(TY+“’ + (Ty+“) r n + Con(TY+“),.(i+p,)), 
and Induction Hypothesis with di = 1, fl = fl’, jj = y + 3’ together with Lemma 2.1 
yields 
TkCon(TY+“‘),.,l+s., +Con(TY+“)B,. 
So, by (16), A9b and properties of smooth numerations, for all n there is a 6 < w such 
that 
(TY+%(l+p’)+a t-Con((TY+a)B In). 
By Cy-completeness (applied twice) it follows that 
T~Con(TY+“‘),.,,+8,)+s +Con((TY+“)O In). (17) 
So we obtain 
(~y)o~.cl+pj = (TY),a.(l+8,,+wa,.o~Con(TY),l .(w.(1+8,))+w=~.d (by A6b, A4c) 
kCon(TY+“‘),.o +a’,+a (by IH) 
t-Con((Ty+“)B In) (by (17)). 
Case 2.3: B is a limit ordinal. As in Case 1.3, for every n we find a /?’ < /l such that 
(TY+“), In c (Ty+d)pf and 
TFCon(TY+a)af -+ Con((Ty+a)B In). (18) 
On the other hand. we have 
(TY)w”.(1+8) ä Con(TY),=.,l+8cj (by A15b) 
t-Con(TY+“)Bz (by IH and Lemma 2.1) 
FCon((Ty+“)B In) (by (18)). 
Case 3: c1 is a limit ordinal. 
Case 3.1: /I = 0. As in Case 1.3, for every n there is an ordinal U’ < CI such that 
(Ty’“) In E Ty+a’ and 
T kCon(TY+“‘) + Con(TY+a In). (19) 
So. we obtain 
(TY),nt-Con(TY)on (by Aga) 
kCon(TY+“’ ) (by IH and Lemma 2.1) 
I-Con(TY+“fn) (by (19)). 
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Case 3.2: /I = /I’ + 1 is a successor ordinal. As in Case 2.2, for every n we find an 
~1’ < ~1 such that (TY+@) fn c Ty+” + Con(TY+“)B. and 
TkCon(TY+“’ + Con(TY+“)B,) --,Con((TY+d)B /n). (20) 
Let 1 be such that CI’ + 1 = c(, then clearly 1 < I 6 ~1. By Induction Hypothesis with 
E = 2, p = B’, y” = y + a’ and Lemma 2.1 we have 
T~Con(TY+“‘),i.(1+8,) + Con(TY+“)D., 
and so, by (20) 
(TY+a’)o~. (l+p’j+lFCon(TYf”’ + Con(TY+a’),~.o+B.j) 
kCon((TY+a)B In). 
(21) 
By Cy-completeness (applied twice) it follows that 
T~Con(TY’“‘),A.,1+8,)+1 -+CO~((T~+‘)~ In). 
Now we consequtively derive 
(TYk.(i +~,+lj~Con(TY),=.o +8,)+wm’ (by A8a, A4c) 
ä Con(TY),n,.,,i.(,+B,)+1) 
FCon(TY+“‘),A.o +B,j+ 1 (by IH with di = c(‘) 
k-Con((TYfa)p In), (by (21)) 
Case 3.3: b is a limit ordinal. This case is fully similar to Case 2.3, and this 
completes our proof of Lemma 4.5. 0 
Now we are ready to prove our main result. 
Theorem 1. For nice well-orderings, smoothly dejned recursive progressions of theories 
based on iteration of local rejection principles and on iteration of consistency assertions, 
respectively, provably in PRA satisfy the following relationships: for all CI > 1 and all j?, 
1. V”JP =n: T,..,, +o); 
2. (T$ =ny TB+ou. 
Proof. Statement 1 follows from Lemmas 3.3 and 4.5. Statement 2 follows from 1 and 
Lemma 2.6. 0 
Corollary 1. Under the assumptions of the previous theorem, for CI > 1 we have 
1. T” -,,y Tom; 
2. T a z ny T, if and only if tl is an E-number. 
Appendix 
The theory NW0 is formulated in a first-order language with equality containing 
individual constants 0, 1, o; unary predicates SUC, LIM; binary predicate <; and 
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functions +, . and wX. NW0 has the following mathematical axioms: 
1. (1, <) is a linear ordering: 
(a) x<yAy<z+x<z, 
(b) lx < x, 
(c) x<yvy<xvx=y. 
2. Axioms defining 0, 1, w, SUC, LIM in terms of <: 
(a) 0 6 x (x < y abbreviates x < y v x = y), 
(b)O<l~Vy(y<l-*y=O), 
(c) SUC(x)+-+3z < xvy (y < x -+ y < z), 
(d) LIM(x)ox # Or\lSUC(x), 
(e) LIM(w) A Vx < WI LIM(x). 
3. (2, + , 0) is an associative monoid: 
(a) x + (y + z) = (x + y) + z, 
(b) x+0=0+x=x. 
4. Properties relating + and <: 
(a) x f x + y, 
(b) x d y -+ 3u(y = x + u), 
(c) x<y+u+x<u+y, 
(d) x<y+x+u<y+u. 
5. Algebraic properties of. . 
(a) x.(y.z) = (x.y).z, 
(b) x.(y + z) = (x.y) + (x.z), 
(c) x*0=0.x=0, 
(d) x.1=1.x=x. 
6. Properties relating . and <: 
(a) LIM(y)~~<x.y-+3u<y(z<x.u), 
(b) u<UAX#O-+x~U<x~u. 
7. Algebraic properties of ox: 
(a) w” = 1, 
(b) w1 = o, 
(c) w x+Y = ox.gY. 
8. Properties relating < and wX: 
(a) x<y+uY<wy, 
(b) LIM(y) A z < coy -+ 3U < y(z < co”). 
Next we list some theorems of NW0 used in the proof of our main result. 
To simplify the references we enumerate them on a par with the axioms of 
NWO. 
9. (a) z<x+y+Z<XV3U(U<yAZ=X+u). 
The proof is as follows: By Al and A4b 1z < x implies x f z and 
3u(z = x + u). By A4c we have z = x + u A z < x + y + u < y, therefore 
Z<X+yAlZ<X+h(U<yAZ=X+U). q 
(b) z < x + y A y # 0 -+ 3u < y(z < x + u) (by A9a). 
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10. x + 1 is the successor of x: 
(a) x<x+l(becauseO<l+x=x+O<x+lbyA2b,A3b,A4c), 
(b) u < x + 1 + u d x (by A9a, A2b and A3b). 
11. SUC(x)c*3z(x = z + 1) (by A10 and A2c). 
12. (a) SUC(y) -+ SUC(x + y) (by All and A3a), 
(b) LIM(y) -+ LIM(x + y) (by A9a, A2d and A4c). 
13. x < 1 + x (by A4d, A3b). 
14. (a) 1 + 0 = w. 
The proof is as follows: By Al3 we have o < 1 + o. If o < 1 + o then 
3u < w(o = 1 + u) (by A9a and A2b). Then A2e and A12a imply SUC(u) 
(since u < o) and SUC(1 + u), ergo SUC(o), a contradiction. 0 
(b) w < x -+ 1 + x = x (by A4b, A14a and A3a), 
(c) x < w + 1 + x < w (by A4c and A14a), 
(d) x < o --)x + 1 < o (by A2e and AlO). 
15. (a) z < x.(1 + y) A LIM(y) + 3u < y(z < x.(1 + u)). 
The proof is as follows: z < x.(1 + y) = x + x.y implies 3~ < x. y(z Q x + u) 
by A9b. The result follows by A6a, A4c and algebraic properties of. 0 
(b) x < y -+ w”.(l + x) < w”.(l + y). 
The proof is as follows: Suppose x < y, then A8a implies Vu o” # 0, whence 
l+x<l+ybyA4candw”~(l+x)<o”~(l+y)byA6b. 
Recall (cf. Section 2) that by a nice well-ordering we mean a relative interpretation of 
the theory NW0 in PRA such that 
l Its domain D and all atomic predicates, functions, and constants are defined by 
primitive recursive arithmetical formulas (terms). 
l The (interpreted) relation < well-orders the domain D in the standard model of 
arithmetic. 
l Natural numbers can be identified with ordinals <w. 
Clearly, the interpretation of any theorem of NW0 is provable in PRA. On the 
other hand, it is also interesting to notice that PRA proves a lot more about nice 
well-orderings than NW0 itself. This can be seen from the fact that PRA proves 
induction up to o for arbitrary p.r. predicates (Lemma 2.5), including those in the 
language of NWO, whereas NW0 does not. 
Our final goal is the following theorem. 
Theorem A.l. For every recursive e-number 1, there is a nice well-ordering having order 
type 2 in the standard model of arithmetic. 
Proof. This theorem is a typical representative of those results in proof theory which 
can be characterized as “being essentially well-known, but not necessarily well- 
documented”. The closest documented results of similar character that we know 
about are contained in the work of Sommer [15,16], who proves, among many other 
things, that the part of NW0 not involving ordinal multiplication and exponentiation 
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functions can be interpreted in PRA in this way. Moreover, he deals with much more 
restrictive kind of interpretations, namely, with those in a very weak arithmetical 
theory Ido, and such that all atomic relations are interpreted by A,, formulas. 
However, for our present purposes we do not need these results in such a strengthened 
form. 
The method that can be used for a proof of Theorem A. 1 is standard. So, instead of 
going into the technical details of an honest proof, we shall just indicate the main 
ideas. The construction of the required interpretation goes in two steps. 
Let A = E,. First of all, we construct a p.r. well-ordering (E, <s) of type a, that is, 
an interpretation in PRA of the group of axioms Al only. This can be done either 
by referring to the quoted theorem from [15], or, alternatively, one can use a 
standard theorem (cf. e.g. [l 11) stating that every recursive well-ordering can be 
embedded as a p.r. subset into the set of rationals Q. Then it only remains to notice 
that the usual ordering relation on Q is primitive recursive and provably in PRA 
linear. 
At the second step we stipulate that the elements of the ordering (E, <s) code E- 
numbers <i, and we use Cantor normal forms of the terms build-up from the 
elements of E and 0 by the functions + and wX to code the ordinals occurring 
between the s-numbers. Cantor’s normal form theorem then shows that this construc- 
tion gives a unique notation to every ordinal < 2. 
Formally, one can define the set NF of normal forms and the ordering relation 
< by simultaneous primitive recursion, e.g., in analogy with the definition given in 
[lo, p. 863. (However, additional clauses corresponding to s-numbers will be present.) 
Provable linearity of the ordering (E, <s) then guarantees that the ordering < thus 
defined on NF will be provably linear, too. 
Relations WC, LIM, and functions $ and wX are easily and primitively 
recursively explained in terms of Cantor normal forms. The definition of . is some- 
what more complicated, but can be carried out primitively recursively using the 
formula 
(coal + od’ + . . . + &) .aY = 
i 
d’ + ma2 + ... + coal if y = 0, 
(#,+7 ify>O 
and the distributivity law. (Here we assume 0~1 + ~‘2 + ... + obx to be in Cantor 
normal form, that is, tll > CI~ >, ... >, elk.) 
Most of the axioms Al-A8 are then easy to verify, although some of them, most 
notably the associativity of multiplication, require some patience, because there are so 
many cases to consider. 
To finish with our sketch of the proof of Theorem 2 we mention that the require- 
ment that natural numbers can be identified with ordinals < o in our construction is 
obviously satisfied, because finite ordinals are coded as something like strings of O’s, 
and the fact that any such string has a certain natural number as its length is clearly 
verifiable in PRA. 
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